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I use data from StockTwits and Twitter to provide evidence that investor attention on social 
media in the period before earnings is related to short-term overvaluation, consistent with bullish 
investors herding around common information. In the 2 to 60 days after earnings, returns for 
companies in the highest quintile of pre-earnings announcement investor attention are 4.2 
percent lower than those of companies in the lowest quintile. I find evidence that the negative 
post-earnings drift result found in this study is related to investors waiting until after earnings are 
announced to enact costly arbitrage strategies. I further examine intra- and inter-network herding 
and find evidence that social media influences investors beyond the population of active users. 
This study contributes to prior literature on herding, social media, and speculation and arbitrage. 
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1 Introduction 
This study examines the association between investor attention on StockTwits and 
Twitter in the period preceding earnings announcements and negative equity market returns in 
the period after earnings are announced. This is important because social media has changed the 
way that investors access and process information, lowering the costs of information acquisition 
but exposing investors to information with questionable accuracy or focus. Investor attention on 
social media, as opposed to investor attention on search engines or investor attention as proxied 
by volume, is inherently collaborative because users can interact and view one another’s posts 
(Bartov et al. 2018). Prior literature has found that there is online, public information that can 
partially preempt earnings (Bagnoli et al. 1999, Bartov et al. 2018). I contribute to this literature 
by providing evidence consistent with attention-constrained investors using social media to 
research and identify stocks to buy, which results in increasing short-term overvaluations as 
more investors pay attention and act on a common set of information. 
The internet has changed the financial information ecosystem and reduced information 
and investing frictions for retail investors. Starting with message boards and more recently 
continuing with social media, the internet has made it easier for investors to work together to 
process information. Ideally, these connectivity platforms help improve the information available 
to and understanding of information among investors, especially retail investors. My results 
suggest, however, that investor attention on social media as proxied by number of active 
StockTwits users in the pre-earnings-announcement period (-10 to -2 days relative to earnings) is 
related to temporary overvaluation. These results are consistent with prior literature on herding 
through social learning (Fudenberg and Kreps 1995) and imitation (Banerjee 1992, Bikhchandani 
et al. 1992, Shiller 1995, Hirshleifer and Teoh 2003).  
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While this study does incorporate a set of posts from Twitter, the main focus is on data 
from StockTwits, a financial social media platform. StockTwits, per their Google search headline 
“Share Ideas & Learn from Passionate Investors & Traders” is based on the premise that users 
will influence each other.1 StockTwits is like other social media sites, such as Twitter or 
Facebook, in that users are able to directly communicate with each other opening the possibility 
of users influencing collective opinions. Due to this collaborative environment, active 
participation on StockTwits can be contrasted to other internet-based proxies for attention like 
Google search volume where investors are not necessarily provided with and influenced by 
insights from other investors. I find evidence that could be interpreted as active users’ posts 
influence investors that are not actively participating as well. 
I use social media data to examine investor attention and sentiment in the period before 
earnings. Consistent with the results in Bartov et al. (2018), I find that the average sentiment 
from the group of users discussing stocks in the period before earnings is positively associated 
with earnings period returns, whereas investor attention, defined as the number of active users in 
the pre-earnings period, is negatively associated with both the earnings period returns and post-
earnings period returns, This indicates the crowd on social media is often discussing relevant 
earnings information, but that attention is related to investor herding around stale information 
and overshooting expectations, causing short-term overvaluation. I also test for and find evidence 
that overconfidence (Oskamp 1965, Khaneman and Tversky 1974) related to the number of 
different topics covered in posts in the pre-earnings-announcement period dominates the 
                                                 
1 In conversations with StockTwits users at their annual meeting, Stocktoberfest, many told me that they learned 
how to trade and are making money with knowledge they gained from the website, consistent with the StockTwits 
website title: “StockTwits © - Share Ideas & Learn from Passionate Investors & Traders.”  
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association between social media attention and overvaluation, indicating the influence of social 
media goes beyond users that are actively participating. 
As noted in Barber and Odean (2007):  
How can we measure the extent to which a stock grabs investors’ attention? A 
direct measure would be to go back in time and, each day, question the hundreds 
of thousands of investors in our datasets as to which stocks they thought about 
that day. Since we cannot measure the daily attention paid to stocks directly, we 
do so indirectly (p. 787).2  
Prior literature has relied on proxies such as trading volume, media attention and extreme returns 
to proxy for events that capture investors’ attention. These proxies, however, are indirect 
measures of investor attention. Abnormal trading volume is indicative of the final decision made 
by investors but does not consider investors that paid attention but did not act. Media attention 
does not consider how investors react to news. Extreme returns may be the result of attention as 
well as material information. I argue that investor attention on social media is a more direct 
measure of investor attention because it 1) identifies investors’ response to news, and 2) includes 
investors that pay attention but don’t trade. This is important because it allows for measurement 
of the information qualities that lead to short-term speculative overvaluation. I do not find 
evidence that when the sentiment of the crowd is negative there is undervaluation and attribute 
this to short-selling constraints. 
 I expect that StockTwits caters primarily to retail investors who focus on picking stocks 
to buy rather than short sell. This could be in part due to the increased costs for short-selling 
(D’Avolio 2002). Consistent with overvaluation due to a segment of investors using social media 
to research stocks to buy, I find that post-earnings (pre-earnings) period returns are significantly 
                                                 
2 See also Klibanoff et al. (1998): “The underlying problem facing financial economists is that neither fundamentals 
nor other possible determinants of investor behavior, such as ‘investor sentiment,’ are observable.” 
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negatively (positively) associated with investor attention when sentiment is positive but are not 
associated with investor attention when sentiment is negative. I support this by providing cross 
sectional evidence that the attention-overvaluation association is only significant when both 
traditional media and social media sentiment are positive, consistent with investors being 
influenced by a bullish feedback loop. In other cross-sectional tests, I find that the association 
between overvaluation and investor attention in the pre-earnings-announcement period is more 
pronounced in samples with lower institutional ownership, which provides evidence that that 
arbitragers postpone their strategies when limited by short-selling constraints. 
Returns in the 60-day period after earnings announcements are negatively associated with 
investor attention, regardless of earnings surprise. Miller (1977) explains this anomaly with a 
model in which price is a function of collective opinion. In pre-earnings announcement periods 
where information is correct but possibly stale or noisy, price formation is delayed as bearish, 
short-selling constrained investors are kept out of the market. In this model, based on the 
equilibrium point where supply meets demand, price increases as the bullish group of investors 
herds around stale information and causes price to overshoot its fundamental value. Chen et al. 
(2001) and Kelly and Tetlock (2013) provide expanded theoretical models for the discussion in 
Miller (1977). 
I make three main contributions with this study. First, I add to the literature on herding by 
examining the market impact of investor attention to publicly viewable information. The ease 
with which information can be disseminated on social media (Blankespoor et al. 2014) makes it 
an ideal platform for low-cost information acquisition by investors. This low-cost barrier makes 
it an especially viable source of information for less sophisticated investors who may have 
knowledge limitations and cost barriers not shared by their institutional counterparts. In Figure 1, 
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I find that the relationship between attention on social media and negative post-earnings return 
drift is near-monotonic across quintiles of investor attention. 
Second, I elaborate on the results in Bartov et al. (2018) which finds that sentiment on 
social media is predictive of earnings surprise and returns. This finding shows that valuable 
information is being shared on social media, which makes is it an ideal platform for information 
acquisition. StockTwits feeds at the time of this writing are incorporated in platforms including: 
Bloomberg, Thomson Reuters, Interactive Brokers, Fidelity, Charles Schwab, Trading 
Technologies, and eSignal. Social media has been shown in the literature and demonstrated by its 
use in trading platforms to be a viable source of financial information. However, it seems the 
market is not efficiently incorporating the level of attention given to stocks, as evidenced by the 
negative post-earnings drift found in this paper. This should be of interest to investors and 
regulators, since as SEC Chairman Jay Clayton said: “serving and protecting Main Street 
investors is my main priority at the SEC” (SEC 2018). 
Third, I contribute to the literature on speculative trading and arbitrage. Brunnermier and 
Abreu (2002, 2003) develop a model in which investors do not know when mispricing will be 
corrected. Short-horizon investors predict not only fundamentals, but also the behavior of other 
investors. Social media offers an ideal setting to test this. With the assumption that a segment of 
the investing population is short-selling constrained by fees, search problems or offsetting capital 
(D’Avolio 2002) investors using social media to research stocks to buy in advance of earnings, in 
line with Miller (1977), cause a temporary price increase. When earnings are announced, these 
investors are no longer focused on earnings, which allows price to return to fundamentals. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a review of the 
literature and hypothesis development. Section 3 describes the research design. Section 4 details 
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the data used and descriptive statistics. Section 5 presents the empirical results, and I conclude in 
Section 6. 
2 Literature Review and Hypothesis Development  
2.1 StockTwits as a Financial Information Aggregator 
Hayek (1945) gave one of the first economics-based arguments for decentralized 
aggregation of information. At the time, economists were involved in conversations about 
whether a centralized economy or a distributed economy was the most efficient. Hayek argues 
that decentralized decisions are better able to incorporate idiosyncratic information. Hayek 
(1945) is supported by studies that investigate countries that split up after World War 2. For 
example, the unsuccessful centralized economy in East Germany versus the more successful 
decentralized economy in West Germany. Social media extends this concept and can be 
contrasted with centralized or traditional media. Today, social media posts are often featured in 
traditional media stories and media outlets and media articles are often disseminated on social 
media. Media decentralization has gotten to a point where it is difficult to distinguish traditional 
media from social media. 
StockTwits has become a valuable source of information about stocks as it allows for an 
efficient method of aggregating information about stocks from a heterogeneous group of users. 
The founders of StockTwits invented cashtags, a way for investors to qualify words as tickers by 
prepending a dollar sign to the ticker. This seemingly simple idea allows for the efficient 
aggregation of company-specific information and therefore more efficient communication 
among investors. The cashtag is now a widely-accepted way to qualify ticker symbols and is 
used on StockTwits as well as Twitter, with Twitter adopting a few years after the success on 
StockTwits. Finding company information about Agilent using ticker symbol “A” is extremely 
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noisy. It is computationally difficult to discern the much more common article “a” from the 
ticker for Agilent. However, searching for “$A” on Google will lead to StockTwits and other 
results about Agilent. 
 The posts on social media leverage the power of decentralization and aggregation. 
Investors can go to social media to see what people are saying and to get an idea about current 
news. The commentaries on social media about current news help add color for investors without 
access to insiders, staff or private trading platforms.  
2.2 Herding and Independence 
 Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003), in their review of information cascades and herding, give a 
thorough development of the behavioral components that lead to correlated actions among 
individuals. They define herding as a convergence in behavior and cascading as ignoring private 
information. They include direct communication and observational influence as possible sources 
of herding. Cascading can be thought of as a unit autoregressive process where each action is 
determined only by the last action. For example, if a group of investors only used the trade at 
time t-1 as the basis the next trade at time t0 then each subsequent action would be the same for 
all t. Banerjee (1992) and Bikhchandani et. al. (1992) propose cascading as the mechanism 
responsible for causing herding. Shiller (1995) applies these concepts to a social setting in which 
herding is based on convergence to group norms through social interaction, as would possibly 
occur on social media. 
 Models of herding have a commonality in that they all rely on a lack of independence 
between individuals in a group. On StockTwits as more investors share information and have 
discussions in the pre-earnings period, these investors are potentially exerting increasing 
influence on one another through their social interactions. StockTwits is often a top result in 
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search engines3 and is used in many trading platforms, so even investors that are not active on 
StockTwits are also potentially exposed to the information from these social interactions. I 
assume that investor attention on StockTwits is correlated with the overall level of market 
attention, and investor attention on StockTwits is likely to influence less sophisticated investors, 
who would be more likely to ignore their private information as in models of herding. When 
these investors are focusing on stocks to buy and there are market-wide arbitrage constraints, this 
would lead to overvaluation as new bullish investors enter the equities market and bearish 
investors are kept out of the market. 
Curtis et al. (2016) find evidence that contemporaneous earnings-period investor 
attention is related to more rapid price discovery around earnings announcements, which is 
consistent social media aiding the alignment investors’ opinions. I find that social media 
sentiment in the pre-earnings period is positively associated with earnings-period returns, which 
provides evidence that social media users are providing actionable information. However, as 
more investors acquire information from social media and contribute to social media, there is 
potentially a self-reinforcing feedback mechanism in which investors act on bullish sentiment, 
price subsequently increases, speculators are validated, and the security gets more attention in 
the short-term only to decrease in price after the earnings event. In addition to online 
interactions, StockTwits users interact in physical social situations. Figure 1 presents the 
StockTwits meetups in North America. This figure shows that 13,437 people where potentially 
meeting up in 2017 to discuss how to make money in the stock market. These face-to-face 
meetings may further degrade the independence between users. 
                                                 
3 StockTwits is a top result for about 2/3 of the sample used in this study and in the sample of all tickers in 2014 and 
2015 available on CRSP. 
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2.3 Social Media and the Wisdom of Crowds 
Bartov et al. (2018) examine opinion formation on social media using constructs from the 
wisdom of crowds. The genesis of the term wisdom of crowds can be traced to Dr. Francis 
Galton’s 1907 study titled “Vox Populi” in which individuals’ guesses about the weight of a 
dressed ox at a local fair were used as data to provide empirical evidence on the wisdom of 
crowds. He found that when the guesses of individuals were averaged, the collective guess was 
near perfect. This finding is congruent with the Central Limit Theorem which states that when a 
group of observations is independent and identically distributed, the observations converge to a 
normal distribution as the number of observations increases. In the case of peoples’ guesses, 
ideally, this distribution would be around the actual value. The difference between the setting at 
the fair and the setting on social media is that social media users use the platform explicitly for 
communication whereas the attendees at the fair did not have information about one another’s 
guesses. 
The Wisdom of Crowds by James Surowiecki (2004) gives 4 necessary conditions for 
wise crowds: diversity of opinion, independence, decentralization, and aggregation.4 Surowiecki 
(2004) offers several instances when crowds are not wise because they violate some element of 
the wisdom of crowds. In the case of social media there is diversity of opinion, decentralization 
and aggregation, but users can influence each other and those that view their public interactions 
and thereby potentially violate the independence condition. In a setting with investors focused on 
picking stocks to buy, this would lead to overvaluation as investors herd around information 
                                                 
4 Surowiecki (2004) has 566 citations from papers that are indexed on Google scholar and include the terms 
“earnings” or “accounting.” 
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indicating bullish outcomes. Following Miller (1977), overpricing increases as bullish investors 
establish new positions in a stock while bearish investors are kept out of the market.  
2.4 Speculative Trading and Arbitrage 
Brunnermier and Abreu (2002, 2003) provide theoretical models in which investors face 
a synchronization risk when arbitraging mispricing. If arbitrageurs act immediately they incur 
holding costs that can make their strategy prohibitive. So, instead they try to time their strategies 
so as to minimize holding costs. When a sufficient number of arbitrageurs synchronize their 
timing, price begins to return to fundamental value. An alternate explanation for the results in 
this paper is that post-earnings liquidity trading causes price to return to fundamental value 
(Bernard and Thomas 1989, 1990). In Bernard and Thomas (1989, 1990) transaction costs make 
it prohibitive for arbitrageurs to act on their knowledge of mispricing and price slowly drifts 
toward the fundamental price after earnings are announced.  
Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000) find evidence that retail investors in Finland are net 
buyers of momentum stocks with weak future performance and that institutional investors are net 
buyers of momentum stocks with strong future performance. In contrast, Boehmer et al. (2016) 
find that stocks with the highest positive (negative) order imbalance5 in the prior week have the 
highest positive (negative) abnormal returns in the next 20 days. Lawrence et al. (2018) find 
evidence of a causal link between advertisements on Yahoo! and contemporaneous positive 
abnormal returns when companies beat analyst earnings expectations. This study complements 
Lawrence et al (2018) by providing evidence that investor attention in speculative periods leads 
                                                 
5 Defined as dollar value of shares bought less the dollar value of shares sold scaled by the average daily trading 
volume over the prior year. 
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to overvaluation. Short selling constraints offer a reason for why there is an association between 
attention and overvaluation and not undervaluation. 
Regulation T provides that brokers that lend shares to short sellers must have a “bona 
fide” cash deposit to offset the lent shares. Firms that lend shares also charge interest on the 
shares further increasing the short selling premium. Short selling agreements can vary among 
brokers, but they generally include a fee discount for the cash collateral. The interest rates in the 
proprietary set used in Reed (2002) range from the special rate of 7.6 percent to the regular rate 
of 5.8 percent. D’Avolio (2002), also using a proprietary dataset, shows that the special rate can 
be as high as 79 percent. Almazan et al. (2004) note that “73.3 percent of the 679 funds that filed 
Form N-SAR in 1994 reported that their investment policies formally restricted them from 
selling short” (p. 9). These significant frictions offer a plausible explanation for why investors 
herding around bullish social media information can be difficult to arbitrage.  
In addition to extra costs, there can be search problems for investors that want to sell 
short. Prior literature has found that the search costs for finding a lender decrease with the level 
of institutional ownership (Almazan et al. 2004, D’Avolio 2002). D’Avolio (2002) finds that the 
special rate increases with attention on Yahoo! Message Boards. As barriers to arbitrage 
increase, I expect that mispricing will be more sensitive to investor attention on social media. 
Models of short selling constraints in prior literature assume prices are a weighted 
average of beliefs (supply and demand) from a heterogeneous set of investors (Miller 1977). 
Shares sold short are borrowed, in effect increasing the supply of shares in the market and 
theoretically shifting the intersection between supply and demand to the right, lowering price. 
Short sales constraints inflate prices by forcing bearish investors out of the market (Lintner 1969, 
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Miller 1977, Figlewski 1981, Jarrow 1981). The short-term overpricing effects of short sales 
constraints increase as the level of disagreement between bullish and bearish investors increases.  
I draw upon the models of short-selling constrained investors in Chen et al. (2001) and 
Kelly and Tetlock (2013), which build on models in Miller (1977). The simple theoretical model 
in Kelly and Tetlock (2013) examines the investing population using three sets of investors: A) 
investors that are 100 percent rational without short-selling constraints that always pay attention, 
B) investors that are less than 100 percent rational without short-selling constraints that always 
pay attention, C) investors that are less than 100 percent rational with short-selling constraints 
that are not 100 percent attentive. The market clearing price (or price at which the demand from 
investors in {A, B, C} equals supply) includes a mispricing term that is proportional to sentiment 
and attention. The mispricing term in Kelly and Tetlock (2013) is a function of sentiment, 
attention, short-selling constraints, disagreement and risk tolerance. When there are short-selling 
constraints, overpricing increases with sentiment and attention. This leads to my hypothesis, 
stated in the alternative: 
H1: Investor attention on social media in the pre-earnings-announcement period is positively 
related to overvaluation. 
3 Empirical Design 
I start the empirical design section with a description of the textual analysis methods 
incorporated in this study. Textual analysis, while not directly applicable to the main variable of 
interest, investor attention on social media, is a component of the experimental design and thus 
necessary to explain for later exposition of the models employed. 
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3.1 Sentiment Measurement 
I use a supervised machine learning method known as the Paragraph Vector method 
(Mikolov and Le, 2014) to classify the level of bullishness of unclassified posts in the 
StockTwits and Twitter datasets used in this study. This method utilizes a neural network that 
incorporates the position of words used in documents. This is in contrast to bag of words 
methods that assume independence between words. The Paragraph Vector method is ideal for 
StockTwits data because of the approximately 8 million user-classified posts in the dataset that 
facilitate supervised learning. In untabulated results, I find that Paragraph Vector-based 
classification is more accurate than Naïve Bayes classification. The Paragraph Vector 
classification used in this paper is 64% accurate in the full set of posts. The Naïve Bayes 
classification using the same training data is 55% accurate. Both methods are more accurate with 
smaller datasets. Training with millions of user-classified records introduces noise to the extent 
that users say the same thing with different explicit opinion qualifiers. For example, if User A 
posts “I am excited about $A earnings” (user-classified as bullish) and User B posts “I am 
excited about $A earnings” (user-classified as bearish), these posts introduce noise in the 
classification model. 
 To quantify user sentiment, each unclassified post is given a value that indicates the 
probability of the post being either positive (bullish) or negative (bearish). If a post is user-
classified as bullish, it is given a sentiment value of 1. If a post is user-classified as bearish, it is 
given a sentiment value of -1. The paragraph vectors from the set of user-classified bullish and 
bearish posts are used to calculate the parameters of a logistic regression model. I use these 
parameters with the Paragraph Vectors of unclassified posts to calculate the probabilities of 
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unclassified posts being either bullish or bearish. I use the average sentiment from each user in 







Where i is the index for each post from a given user. SM Sent is the by-user average sentiment in 
the pre-announcement period t.   
3.2 Using LDA to Measure User-Generated Information 
Shiller (2017) uses the term “narrative economics” to describe how narratives influence 
economies and provides a discussion of how people think in terms of narratives. Thorsrud (2018) 
uses Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) learned topics as a proxy for narratives in news stories 
and shows that LDA topics and sentiment in media articles can be used to predict economic 
fluctuations. I use LDA to classify the topics that social media users are discussing around 
earnings. This unsupervised learning algorithm uncovers latent topics using the underlying 
frequencies of the words used in documents. Although the label of the topics used in this study 
does not influence the results, I manually add labels to the topics to help make the divisions more 
salient. The topics include technical, earnings speculation, past earnings info, attention to news, 
recommendations, SEC filings and earnings news. 
LDA assumes documents are combinations of topics and topics are based on word 
frequency distributions. The LDA algorithm uses sampling based on known priors (word 
frequencies and number of topics) to train model parameters that maximize the tradeoff between 
the precision of document topic distributions and precision of topic word frequency distributions. 
Chang et al. (2009) finds that LDA classifies topics as a person would. 
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I train the LDA model used in this study on the set of all posts in the -10 to -2 days 
relative to earnings announcements so as to best capture topics discussed in the period before 
earnings. Prior to training the model, I convert all cashtags from their specific form to a generic 
form (e.g. $A to $cashtag), convert all mentions (e.g. @bob to @mention), convert all links (e.g. 
http://www.yahoo.com to |link), convert numbers (e.g. 123 to #number) and lemmatize all words 
(e.g. stopping to stop). I train the model with the cleaned set of posts. I then use the trained 
model to derive the most representative topic for each post. For each quarterly announcement I 
construct a variable Ln(#Topics) which equals the natural log of the number of topics discussed 
in the pre-earnings period. 
I vary the number of topics between 20 and 80 and find similar results with these 
variations. I use 40 topic categories in this study. Topics with written-in names are provided in 
Appendix B. The categories include words that indicate topics including: current news, past 
news, user speculation, technical charts, and earnings news.  
In line with prior literature that has provided evidence that retail investors are more likely to buy 
rather than short a stock (for example, Barber and Odean 2007), and with literature on 
information and overconfidence. Oskamp (1965) was one of the first studies to show that people 
become more confident as the amount of information they use in a decision increases, even if 
new information is not material. In his experimental study, subjects were given information 
about a case study. As the subjects were given more (but not relevant) info, their confidence 
about being correct rose from 33 to 53% while their accuracy remained consistently below 30%. 
They describe a similar study on the “representativeness” bias: confidence in new, but worthless 
information without regard to prior probabilities. Subjects in the representativeness study were 
told that 2/3 of a population were engineers and 1/3 lawyers. When the subjects were given 
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additional but worthless information their guesses were around 50%, whereas without that 
additional information, the subjects’ guesses were closer to the prior probabilities. 
3.3 Empirical Models 
3.3.1 Main Model 
 The main research question concerns whether there is an association between attention on 
social media and short-term overvaluation. I therefore begin the empirical analysis with an 
examination of the association between the number of active users in the pre-earnings-
announcement period (-10 to -2 days relative to the earnings announcement) and abnormal 
returns. I examine the attention-returns association in three timespans: -10 to -2 days relative to 
earnings, -1 to 1 days around earnings, and 2 to 60 days6 after earnings are announced. The pre-
earnings timespan captures the contemporaneous association between social media attention and 
returns. The earnings period timespan captures the preemptive nature of the association between 
attention and returns. The post earnings timespan is of interest for answering the main research 
question, whether social media attention leads to short-term overvaluation. This model assumes 
that price adjusts to the arrival of fundamental information in the earnings period, but does not 
completely resolve overvaluation from the shift in the investing population. If the overvaluation 
were resolved in the earnings period then there should be no drift in the post earnings period. I 
used the following model, Model 1 to test for an association between overvaluation and 
attention: 
𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛼 +  𝜷𝟏𝑳𝒏(#𝑼𝒔𝒆𝒓𝒔)𝒊,𝒋,[−𝟏𝟎,−𝟐] +  ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑘,𝑖,𝑗
𝑘
+ 𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 
                                                 
6 I follow Bernard and Thomas (1989), which finds that most drift occurs in the 60 days after earnings are 
announced, I examine abnormal returns in the 2 to 60 days after earnings are announced to identify return reversals. 
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AR are the market-adjusted abnormal returns in period t relative to the quarterly earnings 
announcement i for firm j. The main variable of interest in this model is 𝐿𝑜𝑔(#𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑠)−10,−2. I 
expect that β1 will be positive in the period before earnings are announced and negative in the 
period after earnings are announced, consistent with short-term overvaluation and subsequent 
reversal. I test H1 in the period after earnings are announced, when investors are no longer have 
incentive to speculate on earnings. 
 I support the association between investors using social media and the search for stocks 
to buy and overvaluation with an examination of investor attention and order imbalance. I use 2 
different measures of order imbalance: 1) overall order imbalance with buys and sells classified 
using the algorithm in Chakrabarty et al. (2007), and 2) retail order imbalance as classified by the 
algorithm in Boehmer et al. (2017). The Chakrabarty et al. (2007) algorithm extends the Lee and 
Ready (1993) algorithm to better account for trades that occur inside the bid and ask quotes, 
which controls for misclassification of stocks that are shorted. Boehmer et al. (2017) relies on 
retail orders being filled through a wholesale market which can be uncovered with fraction of 
cent trades on the FINRA Trade Reporting Facility. I examine the association between investor 
attention and buying stocks using Model 2, shown below: 
𝑂𝐼𝑀𝐵𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛼 +  𝜷𝟏𝑳𝒏(#𝑼𝒔𝒆𝒓𝒔)𝒊,𝒋,[−𝟏𝟎,−𝟐] + ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑘,𝑖,𝑗
𝑘
+ 𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 
OIMB is the order imbalance in period i relative to the quarterly earnings announcement at time t 
for firm j. I expect that β1 will be positive in the period before earnings are announced for retail 
order imbalance. In support of H1, I expect that β1 will be positive for overall and retail order 
imbalance in the period before earnings. I expect that overall order imbalance will be negative in 
the period after earnings are announced. 
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 I examine the association between social media attention and synchronization risk for 
investors that do not currently own the overvalued stocks using short selling data from the 
NASADQ PSX exchange. Because there are many additional costs such as having offsetting 
capital, margin payments when price fluctuates, and opportunity costs (D’Avolio 2002), it is 
beneficial for short sellers to wait until after earnings are announced to sell short. I use Model 3, 
described below, to test this: 
𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛼 +  𝜷𝟏𝑳𝒏(#𝑼𝒔𝒆𝒓𝒔)𝒊,𝒋,[−𝟏𝟎,−𝟐] + ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑘,𝑖,𝑗
𝑘
+ 𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 
Where Short Interest is the number of shared sold short scaled by shares outstanding in period i 
relative to the quarterly earnings announcement at time t for firm j. If arbitrageurs are timing 
their strategies, I expect that the coefficient on β1 will be more negative in the period after 
earnings are announced. 
3.3.2 Intra- or Inter-Network Herding? 
 If social media users are herding around information that is pushed to their accounts, then 
I expect that attention from users with the most visibility (proxied for by their number of 
followers) will have a larger negative association with post-earnings returns than the total level 
of social media attention. However, since StockTwits is often a first-page Google search result 
and is incorporated in several trading platforms, I might not find evidence of within-network 
herding. For each year in the StockTwits dataset, I rank StockTwits users by their number of 
followers (people that subscribe to their posts) and label the top 1000 users. I use this set of top 
users to measure the effects of intra-network herding. Model 4 is shown below: 
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AR are the market-adjusted abnormal returns in period i relative to the quarterly earnings 
announcement at time t for firm j. If only investors within the StockTwits platform are buying, 
then I expect the coefficient from the users with the most followers, 𝛽2, will be greater than the 
coefficient on 𝛽1in the post-earnings period. 
 If instead, investors that don’t participate, but use the information on StockTwits, are 
driving the short-term overvaluation then I expect that these users will be more likely to buy a 
stock based on the number of topics covered in the posts that they browse, consistent with prior 
behavioral findings in Oskamp (1965) and Khaneman and Tversky (1974). I use Model 5, shown 
below to examine inter-network herding resulting from overconfidence: 
𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛼 +  𝜷𝟏𝑳𝒏(#𝑼𝒔𝒆𝒓𝒔)−𝟏𝟎,−𝟐 +  𝜷𝟐𝑳𝒏(#𝑻𝒐𝒑𝒊𝒄𝒔)−𝟏𝟎,−𝟐 + ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑘,𝑖,𝑗
𝑘
+ 𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 
If investors that come across StockTwits (this includes investors that are members of StockTwits 
as well as investors that incorporate StockTwits chatter in their decisions) are convinced to buy 
because of a greater number of topics, then I expect that 𝛽2 will be negative and significant in the 
post-earnings period. If investors outside of the active StockTwits community become 
overconfident as a result of the information shared on the site, then 𝛽2 will be less than 𝛽1 in the 
post-earnings period.  
3.4 Control Variables 
 I add controls for firm characteristics and sources of public information other than social 
media. I add Market Cap, the natural logarithm of the number of shares outstanding multiplied 
by the share price at the end of the fiscal quarter to control for lower information content in the 
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earnings news for larger firms (Ataise 1985). I add Ln(#Analysts), the natural logarithm of the 
analyst following in the I/B/E/S Summary database, to control for the demand for information 
from sophisticated investors (Bhushan 1989).7 I add Market to Book, calculated using Compustat 
quarterly market and book values, to control for value or earnings yield (Penman et al. 1996, Ball 
et al. 2017). I add Institutional% to control for the level of investor sophistication (Potter 1992) 
and short-selling constraints (Miller 1977). I add a Q4 indicator variable to control for 
information differences in the 4th fiscal quarter (Das and Shroff 2002). I add standardized 
unexpected earnings (SUE) to control for the impact of new information about cash flows. 
 I add additional controls for media attention and sentiment, StockTwits sentiment, and 
attention to the SEC’s EDGAR website. I proxy for media attention with the natural log of the 
number of news article observations in the RavenPack database (Ln(#News Stories)). For each 
observation in the RavenPack database, I center the RavenPack Composite Sentiment Score 
(CSS) around zero and rescale the range to [-1, 1]. I take the average of the scaled sentiment in 
all news stories to proxy for the news sentiment (News Sent). I include SM Sent to control for the 
average sentiment of users on StockTwits. Finally, I include Ln(Retail EDGAR IP) to control for 
investors’ demand for fundamental information. I calculate Ln(Retail EDGAR IP) using the 
EDGAR IP logs and according to the algorithm in Drake et al. (2015).  
4 Data and Descriptive Statistics 
 The data sources and variables are listed in Appendix A. Social media data are from 
StockTwits and Twitter. StockTwits data were granted by StockTwits management. StockTwits 
                                                 
7 The firms used in this study have at least on analyst following them during the given firm-quarter. In untabulated 
tests, social media activity from firms with no analyst following has a weaker (not statistically significant) 
correlation with equity market returns.   
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data consists of the complete set of posts in the years 2014 and 2015. In addition to the post 
itself, each record includes, among other things, attributes of the user, the time of the post, user 
sentiment, and cashtags used. StockTwits has no limitation on stocks that can be discussed, so 
the final sample consists of all companies that have active users participating in the -10 to -2 
days relative to earnings that can be merged with the other data in the study. StockTwits posts at 
the time of this writing are incorporated in Bloomberg, Thomson Reuters, Interactive Brokers, 
Fidelity, Charles Schwab, Trading Technologies, eSignal, and other online trading platforms. An 
example post is provided in Figure 5. StockTwits is a private company the earns revenue from 
advertising and events. 
 Twitter data were collected using the streaming API in the period from August to 
December 2015. This dataset includes 99.9% of the posts for which a cashtag in the Standard and 
Poor’s 1500 was used. A very small portion of tweets were lost due to rate limiting by the 
Twitter API. 
I use CRSP to calculate abnormal returns and market capitalization. I obtain analyst 
following for each firm from the I/B/E/S summary database. I calculate the percentage holdings 
by institutional investors using the Thomson Reuters Institutional Holdings database, which is 
derived from the 13-F filings of institutional investors. I use the Trades and Quotes (TAQ) 
millisecond intraday data to construct the measures of order imbalance used in this study. I use 
Compustat to construct the measure of market to book. I use RavenPack8 to construct measures 
of news attention and sentiment. Finally, I use EDGAR IP Log files to construct measures of 
attention to fundamental information. 
                                                 
8 “RavenPack analyzes unstructured content from thousands of publications to extract information on named entities 
and financially relevant events in the public eye” (http://www.whartonwrds.com/datasets/ravenpack/). 
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Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for the main results. The average abnormal 
returns in the -10 to -2 days relative to earnings (the pre-earnings-announcement period) as well 
as in the 2 to 60 days after earnings are slightly negative. The main results in this study are 
robust to the inclusion of firm-fixed effects. The mean earnings period returns are near zero. The 
median quarterly earnings announcement had 5 unique active StockTwits users in the pre-
earnings-announcement period. The median of 5 users is similar to the median seen in Table 7 of 
Bartov et al. (2018). The median quarterly earnings announcement had 72 retail EDGAR IP 
accesses and 164 different news observations in RavenPack. The median market to book ratio in 
the sample is 2.574, which is consistent with social media users following glamor stocks. The 
median analyst following is 9. The maximum institutional ownership in the sample is greater 
than 1, which Lewellen (2009) attributes to 13F data only including long positions (that is, shares 
held and lent out for short-selling are included). The portion of the sample with over 100 percent 
institutional ownership is also consistent with Lewellen (2009). The mean standardized 
unexpected earnings (SUE) is positive. The Q4 indicator is 1 about 25 percent of the time, 
consistent with a near-balanced panel of quarterly announcements. 
Table 2 presents the Fama-French 48 industry classifications for the sample used to 
construct the main results. Business Services has the most of observations relative to other 
categories. Business Services has more subcategories than many of the other Fama-French 
classification and encompasses computers and technology. Blankespoor et al. (2014) limit their 
sample to technology firms because these firms have better representation on social media. This 
is consistent with my sample. Agriculture has the fewest observations, also consistent with social 
media users being more likely to be interested in technology-like firms. 
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5 Results 
5.1 Simulation and Actual 
Panel A of Figure 2 presents the results of a simulation based on the theoretical short-
selling constrained equilibrium price in Kelly and Tetlock (2013) and Panel B presents the actual 
market-adjusted abnormal returns contemporaneous with quintiles of StockTwits sentiment and 
attention. The comparison between the two panels assumes that the stocks in Panel B were at 
their fundamental price at the beginning of the pre-earnings-announcement period and no new 
fundamental information has been released in the pre-earnings period. With this assumption, the 
contemporaneous abnormal returns associated with investor attention and sentiment on 
StockTwits align with the simulation of the model of misvaluation in Kelly and Tetlock (2013). 
5.2 Main Results 
 The central research question in this study relates to whether attention on social media in 
the period before earnings is associated with overvaluation. Stated formally, is attention on social 
media in the speculative period before earnings associated with short-term overvaluation? 
Obviously, each post is from someone conveying information that may be or may not be 
relevant, but it is an empirical question whether or not the number of users participating is 
related to attention to stale information. In Figure 3, I provide compelling evidence that attention 
on social media is related to short-term overvaluation. I use 3-Factor plus momentum-adjusted 
returns in graphs to control for firm characteristics that are covary with other firms and cause 
noise. When separated by quintile of attention on StockTwits, I find that post-earnings drift is 
monotonically decreasing in the 3 quintiles with the most attention, with an abnormal returns of -
4.2 %, -1.8% and -0.5%. The 2 quintiles with the last attention have near-zero post-earnings 
drift. 
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Table 3 presents the results of Model 1. In Model 1, the dependent variable is market-
adjusted abnormal returns. The table is divided into three periods: the pre-earnings period (-10 to 
-2 days before earnings), the earnings period (-1 to 1 days around earnings), and the post-
earnings period (2 to 60 days after earnings). The results show that StockTwits Ln(#Users)-10,-2 is 
positively related to returns in the period before earnings (coefficient=0.004, t-statistic=3.24) are 
announced. This finding is consistent with short-selling constrained investors’ stock purchasing 
actions being associated with social media activity. The coefficient on Ln(#Users)-10,-2  during the 
earnings period is negative and significant in the earnings period (coefficient=-0.002, t-statistic=-
2.02), consistent with prior literature that finds there is online information that preempts earnings 
news (Bagnoli et al. 1999, Bartov et al. 2018). The coefficient on Ln(#Users)-10,-2   is also 
negative and significant in the post-earnings period (coefficient=-0.01, t-statistic=-4.69), 
providing additional support for H1.  
Among the noteworthy controls in Table 3, in the post-earnings period the coefficients on 
each of the other proxies for attention are insignificant. Ln(#News Stories)-10,-2 controls for the 
cumulative news coverage and is negative in the pre-earnings-announcement period as well as 
during the earnings period and is not significant in the period after earnings are announced. 
Ln(#News Stories)-10,-2  does not capture the investors’ reaction to news stories. I also include a 
control for the number of retail views (by IP address) of EDGAR information to proxy for 
investor attention to fundamental information. This proxy does capture interest from fundamental 
investors, however, the coefficient in the post-earnings period is insignificant. Other investors do 
not see the interpretations of EDGAR views and therefore this null result for the coefficient on 
Ln(#Retail EDGAR IP)-10,-2  is expected to be zero. 
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 Both the average sentiment from news outlets as well as the average sentiment from 
StockTwits users in the pre-earnings announcement period is positively related to earnings 
period abnormal returns. The finding that news sentiment in 2014 and 2015 is related to earnings 
period returns is in contrast to findings in Bartov et al. (2018) which does not find this 
relationship in 2009-2012. This speaks to the increasing overlap in content between traditional 
and social media. 
In Table 4, I use Twitter posts from the Standard and Poor’s 1500 in the period from 
August 2015 and December 2015 to show that the relationship between attention and 
overvaluation is consistent across social media platforms. The dependent variable is market-
adjusted abnormal returns in both models. The coefficient on Ln(#Users)-10,-2 is similar in 
magnitude in both models, -0.007 on StockTwits and -0.008 on Twitter. The Ln(#Users)-10,-2 
coefficient is more significant in the model using Twitter data, which could be attributed to 
Twitter having better coverage of the investing population. This intuitively makes sense as 
Twitter has a much larger user base than StockTwits and therefore is a less noisy approximation 
of the aggregate level of investor attention. The results also indicate that Twitter sentiment is a 
better predictor of earnings period returns. The coefficient on Twitter sentiment is 0.108 with a t-
statistic of 3.31 whereas the coefficient on StockTwits sentiment is 0.024 with a t-statistic of 
0.72. These results suggest that social media attention in general before earnings is related to 
overvaluation, even when controlling for contemporaneous pre-earnings returns.   
 In Table 5, I present the results of Model 2. I use two measures of order imbalance as my 
dependent variables: retail order imbalance and overall order imbalance. Ln(#Users)-10,-2 is 
positively related to retail order imbalance in both the pre-earnings-announcement period 
(coefficient=0.021, t-statistic=9.60) and the post-earnings-announcement period 
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(coefficient=0.020, t-statistic=9.66). However, Ln(#Users)-10,-2 is only significantly related to 
overall order imbalance in the pre-earnings-announcement period. This finding is consistent with 
social media attention capturing the contemporaneous exuberance of the market, but also with 
the findings in Lee (1992) in which retail investors are likely to buy stocks without considering 
earnings surprise because these events draw the attention of retail investors. Ln(#Users)-10,-2 is 
not significantly related to overall earnings period or post-earnings period order imbalance. The 
lack of a significant relationship suggests that current owners are not arbitraging short-term 
overvalued stocks in this sample. Ln(#News Stories)-10,-2 is positively related to retail order 
imbalance and negatively related to overall order imbalance in the pre-earnings-announcement 
period. This is consistent with prior literature that finds evidence that institutional investors 
provide liquidity to retail investors focusing on glamour stocks (Barber and Odean 2007).  
 In Table 6, I present the results of Model 3 in which the relationship between short 
selling and social media activity around earnings announcements is examined. Abreu and 
Brunnermier (2002) provide a model in which arbitrageurs delay until there is lower 
synchronization risk. If arbitrageurs wait until after earnings are announced to enact their 
strategies, I expect that the relationship between attention on social media and short selling will 
be greater after earnings are announced. In Table 9, I use daily short selling data from the 
NASDAQ PSX exchange to provide evidence that this is the case. The relationship between 
Ln(#Users)-10,-2 and short selling is positive and significant in all periods. Using the Z-statistic to 
test for differences between models (Clogg et al. 1995), the coefficient in the period after 
earnings is significantly greater than in the period before earnings are announced (p-value = 
0.09), providing additional evidence that could be could be construed as arbitrageurs delaying 
their strategies until after earnings are announced. These results suggest that synchronization risk 
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is part of the reason for the negative post-earnings drift associated with social media attention. 
That is, the current owners of the stocks do not seem to be selling after earnings are announced, 
but a population of arbitrageurs that don’t currently own the stocks in this study appear to be 
waiting until after earnings to sell short. 
 Table 7 presents cross-sectional results based on quintile sorts. The dependent variable in 
all models is abnormal returns in the 2 to 60 days relative to earnings. In panels with quintile 
sorts, quintile 1 encompasses the portion of the sample with the lowest levels of the sort variable 
and quintile 5 encompasses the portion of the sample with the highest levels of the sort variable. 
Panel A presents results based on sorts of institutional ownership. Institutional ownership has 
been used as a proxy for shares available to be sold short (D’Avolio 2002, Asquith et al. 2005). 
The coefficient on Ln(#Users)-10,-2 is negative and significant in quintiles 1-3 (coefficients=-
0.014, -0.011, -0.013 for quintiles 1, 2, 3) and not significant in quintiles 4 and 5 (coefficients=-
0.003,-0.001 for quintiles 4, 5), which have the greatest institutional ownership. These results 
provide evidence consistent with synchronization risk when the resolution of short-term 
overvaluation is delayed when it is more costly. 
I examine disagreement as proxied by analyst EPS forecast dispersion in Panel B and find 
evidence that overvaluation increases with uncertainty among analysts, consistent with models 
based on Miller (1977) and with Boehme et al. (2006), which finds that overvaluation is related 
to the dispersion of opinions among investors. I present the results of sorts based on analyst 
following in Panel C and do not find significant variation across these samples. Panel D presents 
the results based on sorts by the level of dispersion of opinions from social media users in the -2 
to -10 days relative to earnings. Ln(#Users)-10,-2 is negative and significant in quintile 5 
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(coefficient=-0.018, t-statistic=-3.03) and insignificant in quintile 1 (coefficient=0.003, t-
statistic=0.47). This result is consistent with the analyst dispersion result in Panel B.  
In Panel E, I present results of a cross sectional analysis based on media sentiment and 
social media sentiment. I find that investor attention in the pre-announcement period is only 
related to future negative returns when both media and social media sentiment are positive 
(coefficient=-0.013, t-statistic=-4.96). This provides evidence that investors are using multiple 
streams of information and are more likely to buy stocks when information in these different 
channels is aligned. This finding supports the feedback loop explanation for herding in 
Fudenberg and Kreps (1995). 
 In Table 8, I separate the sample by positive and negative social media sentiment to 
examine whether there is a difference between investor attention when sentiment is generally 
negative as opposed to when sentiment is generally positive. Consistent with investor attention 
being related to picking stocks to buy and social media users influencing each other, I find that 
abnormal returns in the post-earnings-announcement period are negatively related to investor 
attention when sentiment is positive (coefficient=-0.013, t-statistic=-4.59) and are not related 
when sentiment is negative (coefficient=-0.005, t-statistic=--1.57). Sentiment predicts returns 
only in the set of announcement in which investors were positive.  
 I further examine social media attention when sentiment is positive sentiment in Figure 4. 
Figure 4.1 provides the full-period (-10 to 60 days around earnings) graph of average 3 factor 
plus momentum-adjusted returns for companies that beat analyst expectations for the highest and 
lowest quintiles of social media attention. The stocks that had the least attention prior to 
earnings, have almost no drift after earnings are announced. The set of stocks that had the highest 
levels of social media attention have distinctly negative drift after earnings are announced. The 
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high attention set of companies also seems to be preempting earnings, but only to later reverse 
even beyond the price increase from the earnings surprise. Figure 4.2 provides the results for 
companies that missed analyst expectations. This set of companies also has negative drift after 
earnings are announced. 
5.3 Intra- or Inter-Network Herding?  
In Tables 9 and 10, I present the results of Models 4 and 5 and provide evidence that 
passive users9 are contributing to the herding effects seen in this study. In Table 9, I include 
attention from the most visible users in the network as well as attention from the all active users. 
StockTwits users with the most followers will have their posts viewed by more other users 
within the StockTwits network.10 If active StockTwits users are driving this result then I expect 
attention from top users have a greater effect on herding since users within the platform are more 
likely to see these top users’ posts. In Table 10, I examine the relationship between the number 
or topics covered across all posts and overvaluation. If investors that are either active or 
passively participating in StockTwits are driving the results in this study then I expect the 
number of topics covered will have a greater impact on overvaluation as investors are more 
likely to become overconfident in this setting (Khaneman and Tversky 1974). 
Table 9 provides the results of Model 4 and provides evidence that the most visible users 
on StockTwits are not driving the reversal effect. The coefficient on Ln(#Users)-10,-2 is positive 
and significant (coefficient=-0.007, t-statistic=-2.22) whereas the coefficient on Ln(#Top Users) 
is not significant (coefficient=0.003, t-statistic=0.68). The top-followed users are the most visible 
                                                 
9 Passive users in this context are not active in the StockTwits community in the period before earnings. StockTwits 
is a first-page Google search result for two-thirds of the cashtags used in this study, so it is possible that StockTwits 
chatter is being utilized by investors that are not members of the site. StockTwits feeds are also utilized in 
Bloomberg, Thomson Reuters, Interactive Brokers, Fidelity, Charles Schwab, Trading Technologies, and eSignal. 
10 If a user follows another user the follower will see the posts from the followee. 
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to users within the network. By design their posts are pushed to the greatest number of other 
users. These within-network highly-visible users have the same visibility to investors that come 
across StockTwits as part of their information search. This result suggests that intra-network 
herding is not driving the result found in this study.  
Table 10 presents the results of Model 5 and provides evidence that investors that use 
StockTwits (active or passive) are more likely to buy stocks when more topics are covered in the 
pre-earnings-announcement period, consistent with investors becoming increasingly 
overconfident as more information is presented in the pre-earnings-announcement period. The 
number of topics discussed by users in the pre-earnings-announcement period, Ln(#Topics)-10,-2 
(coefficient=-0.013, t-statistic=-3.32) dominates Ln(#Users)-10,-2  (coefficient=-0.001, t-statistic=-
0.39) in the post-earnings period. At the extreme, if all 40 topics are covered, this would lead to a 
5 percent negative abnormal return in the period after earnings are announced. This provides 
evidence that inter-network herding among the set of investors that utilize social media as an 
information source is driving the negative drift associated with social media attention. The 
results in Table 9 in combination with the results in Table 10, are consistent with passive 
StockTwits users contributing to the overvaluation effect seen in this study. This provides 
evidence that herding on social media spills over to investors that don’t actively participate. 
5.4 The Chicken or the Egg 
 So far this study has left as an open question whether social media users are following the 
market or whether the market is following social media users. That is, generally speaking, are 
social media users discussing events that have already occurred or are they discussing relevant 
speculative information? I examine this question using Grainger causality tests for the complete 
sample timespan (2014 and 2015) and in a panel of the 60 days after earnings are announced. 
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In Table 11, I present the results of this analysis. I find that change in social media 
attention in the full timespan Grainger-causes returns (chi-squared=36.461) and returns 
Grainger-cause change in social media attention (chi-squared=11.921), indicating a general 
cointegrated relationship between social media attention and returns. However, in the panel set 
constructed on the 60 days after earnings are announced, I find that returns Grainger-cause 
change in social media attention (chi-squared=5.483), but change in social media attention does 
not Grainger-cause returns. These results could be interpreted to suggest that StockTwits users 
are more focused on speculation than post mortem analysis of earnings information. 
6 Conclusion 
 This study uses data from StockTwits and Twitter to examine whether investor attention 
on social media is related to short-term overvaluation in the speculative period before earnings 
are announced. I find evidence that social media users (as well as news sources in RavenPack) 
are generally correct about upcoming earnings announcements, but that attention on social media 
is related to short-term overvaluation, providing evidence that social media users, active or 
passive, are paying attention to and acting on stale information. This finding is of interest to 
investors, regulators and academics.  
 This study finds that attention from StockTwits users is related to contemporaneous 
overall order imbalance, but not related to overall order imbalance after earnings are announced. 
This is consistent with current owners of stocks not selling their overvalued stocks, which 
provides evidence that part of the negative drift result found in this study is not attributable to 
synchronization risk from current owners. I also find that the relationship between attention from 
StockTwits users has a greater relationship with short-selling after earnings are announced, 
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indicating that arbitrageurs are timing their strategies. Together these results suggest that the 
negative drift found in this study is related arbitrage from short sellers.   
This study finds evidence that the influence of social media spills over to users that are 
not actively participating in conversations. This is important because it demonstrates that social 
media users are influencing investors that they may not be aware of. This spill-over of 
discussions to trading platforms or investors that come across social media is an interesting area 
for future study that may help add sophistication and understanding to the impacts of this 
relatively new information dissemination platform.  
This study contributes to literature on heading through social learning, to literature on 
social media and to literature on speculation and arbitrage. This study does not intend to imply 
that social media should be regulated. There were speculative bubbles long before social media. 
For example, the Tulip bubble that collapsed in 1637 (Shiller 2005), over 200 years before the 
invention of the telegraph.   
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Variable descriptions  
Variable Description Database 
Abnormal Returns The CRSP return (ret) less the value 
weighted return (vwretd) 
CRSP 
Order Imbalance (OIMB) 
 
The value of stock bought less the 
value of stock sold divided by the total 
value of stock bought and sold: (buy-
sell)/(buy+sell). Buys and sells are 
classified according to the algorithm 
in Chakrabarty et al. (2007) 
TAQ 
 
Retail Order Imbalance (Retail  
OIMB) 
The value of stock bought by retail 
traders less the value of stock sold by 
retail traders. Trades classified 
according to the algorithm in Boehmer 
et al. (2016)  
TAQ 
Short Interest The number of shared sold short 
scaled by the number of shares 
outstanding 
 
Ln(#Users)-10,-2 The natural Ln of the number of 
unique active users in the -10 to -2 
days before earnings are announced 
StockTwits 
Ln(#Top Users) The natural log of the number of users 
in the set of 1000 users with the most 
followers in a given year  
StockTwits 
Ln(#Topics) The entropy of the topics that 
StockTwits users discuss in a given 
time period.  
StockTwits 
Ln(#News Stories) The natural Ln of the number of news 
stories 
RavenPack 
Ln(#Retail EDGAR IP) 
 
The natural Ln of the number of 
EDGAR IP accesses from retail users 
using the algorithm from Drake et al. 
(2015) 
EDGAR IP Logs 
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Appendix A (Cont.) 
 
Variable Description Database 
Ln(#Analysts) The natural log of the number of 
analysts following a firm during the 
given quarter 
I/B/E/S Summary 
Market Cap The shares outstanding multiplied by 
stock price the day before earnings 
are announced 
CRSP 
Market to Book The shares outstanding multiplied by 
share price at the end of the quarter, 
all divided by the book value of 
equity 
Compustat 





News Sent The average sentiment from news 
stories in the given time period 
RavenPack 
Q4 Dummy variable for announcements 










Appendix B LDA topic labels and word weight distributions 
topic # Topic words and weights 
0 recommendations 0.094*know + 0.079*make + 0.070*want + 0.057*got + 0.045*better + 0.044*play + 
0.034*never + 0.026*level + 0.020*away + 0.018*shorting 
1 past earnings info 0.255*er + 0.152*last + 0.146*time + 0.128*close + 0.060*open + 0.015*qtrs + 0.015*sp + 
0.013*am + 0.013*pre + 0.011*fuel 
2 speculation 0.124*sell + 0.048*many + 0.043*love + 0.038*give + 0.033*investor + 0.032*real + 0.027*set 
+ 0.027*every + 0.023*value + 0.021*tell 
3 attention to news 0.235*share + 0.128*|link + 0.031*interesting + 0.026*technoLny + 0.025*per + 0.024*picked + 
0.024*director + 0.022*launch + 0.021*done + 0.021*corporation 
4 noise glamour 0.044*gap + 0.039*bbry + 0.035*always + 0.033*business + 0.031*made + 0.029*minute + 
0.028*pay + 0.026*-- + 0.026*more + 0.025*twitter 
5 sec filing 0.239*new + 0.074*change + 0.049*sec + 0.049*form + 0.048*file + 0.038*reports + 
0.036*filing + 0.035*events + 0.035*check + 0.033*passport 
6 bullish news 0.083*bullish + 0.058*hour + 0.051*morning + 0.040*growth + 0.027*following + 0.026*article 
+ 0.023*early + 0.018*name + 0.015*fda + 0.014*talking 
7 tech charts 0.119*|link + 0.083*chart + 0.041*support + 0.034*q3 + 0.031*bounce + 0.031*show + 
0.029*daily + 0.029*resistance + 0.026*bearish + 0.024*line 
8 predict trends 
positive 
0.160*go + 0.086*u + 0.056*up + 0.048*run + 0.045*higher + 0.039*sale + 0.035*:) + 0.032*ah 
+ 0.026*ready + 0.024*lets 
9 buying stock 0.050*point + 0.040*order + 0.024*finally + 0.024*trader + 0.022*baby + 0.022*remember + 
0.021*mm + 0.020*talk + 0.020*off + 0.017*adding 
10 earnings 
expectations 
0.123*beat + 0.058*guidance + 0.054*miss + 0.041*squeeze + 0.036*the + 0.025*expectation + 
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topic # Topic words and weights 
11 upcoming earnings 0.328*earnings + 0.137*|link + 0.076*analyst + 0.074*release + 0.064*expect + 0.051*eps + 
0.036*thursday + 0.025*wednesday + 0.017*tuesday + 0.017*anybody 
12 attention 0.255*like + 0.169*look + 0.039*v + 0.031*trying + 0.020*find + 0.020*margin + 0.012*+003 + 
0.012*broke + 0.012*agreement + 0.010*panic 
13 noise 0.053*add + 0.045*: + 0.045*nq + 0.038*me + 0.022*ebola + 0.019*part + 0.018*car + 0.015*wtf 
+ 0.014*andy + 0.013*ford 
14 short sell 0.166*short + 0.049*lol + 0.045*right + 0.041*now + 0.040*way + 0.039*money + 0.029*getting 
+ 0.027*bear + 0.024*around + 0.022*lower 
15 bad news 0.090*news + 0.048*bad + 0.040*plug + 0.034*down + 0.033*action + 0.032*this + 0.029*thats 
+ 0.026*nothing + 0.025*mean + 0.025*guess 
16 questions about low 0.091*week + 0.085*next + 0.071*volume + 0.060*looking + 0.054*low + 0.041*anyone + 
0.040*strong + 0.017*idea + 0.016*ago + 0.016*pretty 
17 estimize 0.078*w + 0.071*symbol + 0.069*top + 0.061*estimize + 0.046*game + 0.039*tomorrow  + 
0.026*open + 0.019*covered + 0.015*ipad + 0.015*network 
18 buy and hold 0.047*good + 0.039*see + 0.038*get + 0.037*going + 0.035*long + 0.031*market + 0.029*back + 
0.028*one + 0.028*think + 0.024*would 
19 rating 0.351*|link + 0.036*rating + 0.032*target + 0.030*blackberry + 0.030*pt + 0.019*corp + 
0.016*capital + 0.013*bank + 0.012*security + 0.011*partner 
20 cashtag 0.606*$cashtag + 0.256*#number + 0.018*call + 0.011*&amp; + 0.009*put + 0.009*move + 
0.007*option + 0.006*bought + 0.006*sold + 0.005*may 
21 earnings news 0.113*|link + 0.095*quarter + 0.072*result + 0.051*announces + 0.043*financial + 0.039*first + 
0.039*conference + 0.026*report + 0.024*bb + 0.022*must 
22 insider trade 0.145*|link + 0.073*inc + 0.059*tonight + 0.056*million + 0.047*filed + 0.029*group + 
0.025*update + 0.022*insider + 0.021*event + 0.020*ltd 
23 technical 0.071*third + 0.035*upside + 0.028*surprise + 0.027*took + 0.024*wonder + 0.022*based + 
0.021*later + 0.020*record + 0.019*offer + 0.018*load 
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topic # Topic words and weights 
24 technical positive 0.296*- + 0.118*|link + 0.097*nice + 0.027*breakout + 0.025*second + 0.022*major + 0.020*due 
+ 0.017*setup + 0.015*closing + 0.013*running 
25 earnings 
speculation 
0.064*= + 0.058*little + 0.049*ahead + 0.041*reason + 0.027*bit + 0.027*popular + 0.025*pain + 
0.023*case + 0.021*q4 + 0.021*max 
26 going long 0.069*holding + 0.061*it + 0.055*take + 0.049*well + 0.044*profit + 0.037*green + 0.034*huge 
+ 0.031*bull + 0.027*gonna + 0.024*red 
27 earnings 
expectations 
0.193*price + 0.132*tomorrow + 0.079*announcement + 0.076*movement + 0.071*last + 
0.069*qrtrs + 0.061*reporting + 0.037*friday + 0.033*|link + 0.013*po 
28 market conditions 0.250*stock + 0.075*since + 0.063*drop + 0.050*trading + 0.049*continue + 0.049*er  + 
0.045*positive + 0.037*aftr + 0.030*past + 0.027*pm 
29 advertising 0.059*great + 0.056*buying + 0.053*even + 0.042*selling + 0.036*monday + 0.027*in + 
0.026*imo + 0.024*yet + 0.023*doesnt + 0.022*bottom 
30 my trade 0.108*trade + 0.095*position + 0.059*number + 0.048*added + 0.025*investment + 0.025*recent 
+ 0.024*retail + 0.022*date + 0.021*cap + 0.019*opening 
31 analyst ratings2 0.124*eps + 0.097*estimate + 0.083*|link + 0.080*consensus + 0.080*rev + 0.073*report + 
0.068*compared + 0.055*wall + 0.048*published + 0.047*estimize 
32 discussion 0.412*@mention + 0.180*buy + 0.022*also + 0.020*bell + 0.016*thanks + 0.015*street + 
0.012*too + 0.010*folk + 0.010*nasdaq + 0.009*told 
33 stock pop 0.089*keep + 0.075*guy + 0.067*pop + 0.032*statement + 0.030*is + 0.030*anything + 
0.027*ownership + 0.027*acquisition + 0.021*mkt + 0.020*late 
34 apple 0.063*apple + 0.055*watch + 0.037*ceo + 0.036*|link + 0.024*work + 0.022*product + 
0.020*system + 0.020*co + 0.017*billion + 0.016*store 
35 earnings report 0.338*today + 0.085*revenue + 0.065*q314 + 0.041*potential + 0.030*block + 0.028*full + 
0.020*est + 0.016*report: + 0.014*llc + 0.014*signal 
  
  





Appendix B  (Cont.) 
 
topic # Topic words and weights 
36 announcement 0.117*high + 0.062*quarterly + 0.044*cash + 0.043*dividend + 0.031*hard + 0.029*interest + 
0.027*close  + 0.026*range + 0.026*dec + 0.024*management 
37 momentum 0.038*energy + 0.037*deal + 0.028*mobile + 0.025*head + 0.025*help + 0.024*plan + 0.018*cost 
+ 0.018*key + 0.017*momentum + 0.017*global 
38 trading results 0.176*day + 0.051*another + 0.048*break + 0.037*hit + 0.036*stop + 0.036*month + 0.034*end + 
0.031*again + 0.024*loss + 0.023*gain 
39 technical news 0.066*| + 0.057*tickerchirp + 0.049*tweet + 0.034*trend + 0.032*average + 0.027*risk + 
0.026*via + 0.025*possible + 0.024*current + 0.023*read 
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9. Tables 
Table 1 Descriptive Statistics 
variable N mean variance p10 p50 p90 p99 
AR-10,-2 12,265 -0.004 0.005 -0.069 -0.004 0.060 0.201 
AR-1,1 12,265 0.000 0.016 -0.095 0.000 0.094 0.245 
AR2,60 12,265 -0.014 0.034 -0.215 -0.011 0.156 0.566 
Ln(#Users)-10,-2 12,265 1.946 1.298 0.693 1.609 3.401 5.908 
Ln(#News Stories) -10,2 12,265 5.270 1.456 4.025 5.130 6.739 8.968 
Ln(#Retail EDGAR IP) -10,2 12,265 2.965 7.283 0.000 4.277 6.011 7.547 
SM Sent-10,2 12,265 0.012 0.018 -0.144 0.000 0.189 0.394 
News Sent-10,2 12,265 0.016 0.000 -0.006 0.016 0.036 0.058 
SUE 12,265 0.0002 0.0001 -0.005 0.0004 0.0056 0.0387 
Market Cap 12,265 21.305 3.148 19.106 21.206 23.698 25.813 
Ln(#Analysts) 12,265 2.151 0.498 1.099 2.197 3.091 3.497 
Market to Book 12,265 4.036 42.848 0.986 2.574 8.642 46.364 
Institutional % 12,265 0.622 0.052 0.306 0.661 0.850 1.007 
Q4 12,265 0.2485 0.1868 0 0 1 1 
  This table provides the descriptive statistics for the main results in this study. 
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Table 2 Fama-French 48 Industry Classification 
Industry Classification Count Industry Classification Count 
Agriculture 15 Machinery 327 
Aircraft 71 Measuring and Control Equipment 190 
Almost Nothing 51 Medical Equipment 320 
Apparel 74 Non-Metallic and Industrial Metal Mining 53 
Automobiles and Trucks 240 Personal Services 135 
Banking 844 Petroleum and Natural Gas 558 
Beer & Liquor 32 Pharmaceutical Products 761 
Business Services 1,488 Precious Metals 31 
Business Supplies 135 Printing and Publishing 74 
Candy & Soda 39 Real Estate 56 
Chemicals 283 Recreation 85 
Coal 23 Restaurants, Hotels, Motels 231 
Communication 261 Retail 289 
Computers 294 Rubber and Plastic Products 75 
Construction 162 Shipbuilding, Railroad Equipment 37 
Construction Materials 139 Shipping Containers 28 
Consumer Goods 135 Steel Works Etc. 139 
Defense 16 Textiles 25 
Electrical Equipment 124 Tobacco Products 36 
Electronic Equipment 637 Trading 438 
Entertainment 128 Transportation 310 
Fabricated Products 21 Utilities 447 
Food Products 134 Wholesale 311 
Healthcare 205 *No SIC or not in Fama-French 48 1,297 
Insurance 461 Total  12,265 
   
46 
Table 3 Social media attention and overvaluation 
𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛼 +  𝜷𝟏𝑳𝒏(#𝑼𝒔𝒆𝒓𝒔)𝒊,𝒋,[−𝟏𝟎,−𝟐] + ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑘,𝑖,𝑗
𝑘
+ 𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 
 AR-10,-2 AR-1,1 AR2,60 
Constant -0.125*** -0.109*** -0.207*** 
 (-10.01) (-4.81) (-6.94) 
Ln(#Users)-10,2 0.004*** -0.002** -0.010*** 
 (3.24) (-2.02) (-4.69) 
Ln(#News Stories) -10,2 -0.002
*** -0.002*** 0.001 
 (-3.40) (-2.65) (0.83) 
Ln(#Retail EDGAR IP) -10,2 -0.000 -0.001
** 0.000 
 (-0.86) (-2.32) (0.17) 
SM Sent-10,2 0.036
*** 0.026*** 0.024 
 (6.32) (3.63) (1.64) 
News Sent-10,2 0.334
*** 0.220*** 0.076 
 (8.10) (4.65) (0.78) 
AR-10,-2  -0.059
*** -0.084** 
  (-3.62) (-2.39) 
SUE  1.802*** 0.130 
  (10.77) (0.47) 
Market Cap 0.006*** 0.007*** 0.011*** 
 (8.73) (5.52) (6.40) 
Ln(#Analysts) -0.010*** -0.009*** -0.014*** 
 (-7.20) (-5.03) (-3.58) 
Market to Book -0.000 -0.000** 0.000 
 (-0.93) (-2.40) (0.37) 
Institutional % 0.009*** -0.002 0.004 
 (2.86) (-0.47) (0.47) 
Q4 0.013*** 0.006*** -0.003 
 (9.14) (3.04) (-0.78) 
Observations 12,265 12,265 12,265 
Adjusted R2 0.034 0.034 0.008 
Firm SE cluster yes yes yes 
This table presents of the results to test hypothesis H1. Models are run with clustered standard 
errors. *, **, *** indicate significance at p < 0.10, p < 0.05, and p < 0.01 levels, respectively 
(using two-tailed tests). The t-statistic is shown in parenthesis. 
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Table 4 Twitter vs. StockTwits (S&P 1500) 
 AR2,60 AR2,60 
Constant -0.184*** -0.224*** 
 (-3.07) (-3.45) 
Ln(#StockTwits Users)-10,-2 -0.008*  
 (-1.87)  
Ln(#Twitter Users) -10,-2  -0.007*** 
  (-2.59) 
Ln(#News Stories) -10,-2 0.001 0.001 
 (0.15) (0.29) 
Ln(#Retail EDGAR IP) -10,-2 0.000 0.000 
 (0.36) (0.27) 
StockTwits Sent-10,-2 0.024  
 (0.72)  
Twitter Sent-10,-2  0.108
*** 
  (3.31) 
News Sent-10,-2 0.070 0.062 
 (0.35) (0.31) 
AR-10,-2 -0.120 -0.117 
 (-1.41) (-1.39) 
Market Cap 0.011*** 0.013*** 
 (3.24) (3.51) 
Ln(#Analysts) -0.026*** -0.026*** 
 (-3.31) (-3.38) 
Market to Book 0.000 0.000 
 (0.61) (0.47) 
Institutional % 0.002 0.002 
 (0.13) (0.13) 
Q4 -0.007 -0.006 
 (-0.48) (-0.42) 
Observations 2,962 2,962 
Adjusted R2 0.005 0.010 
Firm SE cluster yes yes 
This table uses 45 million posts of Twitter data collected between August 2015 and December 
2015. This set includes 99.9% of the posts from Twitter users that mentioned the cashtag of a 
company in the S&P 1500. Models are run with clustered standard errors. *, **, *** indicate 
significance at p < 0.10, p < 0.05, and p < 0.01 levels, respectively (using two-tailed tests). The t-







Table 5 Social media attention and order imbalance 
𝑂𝐼𝑀𝐵𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝜷𝟏𝑳𝒏(#𝑼𝒔𝒆𝒓𝒔)𝒊,𝒋,[−𝟏𝟎,−𝟐] + ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑘,𝑖,𝑗
𝑘
+ 𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 












Constant 0.016 -0.094*** 0.057 -0.023 -0.073* -0.097*** 
 (0.40) (-8.38) (1.25) (-1.28) (-1.91) (-9.29) 
Ln(#Users)-10,2 0.021*** 0.002*** 0.017*** 0.001 0.020*** -0.000 
 (9.60) (2.94) (7.02) (0.98) (9.66) (-0.05) 
Ln(#News Stories) -10,2 0.008** -0.002** 0.008** 0.001 0.005* -0.000 
 (2.44) (-2.33) (2.36) (0.95) (1.77) (-0.67) 
Ln(#Retail EDGAR IP) -10,2 0.002* -0.000 0.002 -0.000 0.002* -0.000* 
(1.69) (-0.66) (1.54) (-0.71) (1.66) (-1.70) 
SM Sent-10,2 0.053*** 0.014*** 0.042** 0.003 0.048*** 0.009* 
 (2.97) (2.67) (2.06) (0.36) (3.00) (1.90) 
News Sent-10,2 -0.012 0.018 -0.038 -0.225*** 0.004 0.002 
 (-0.10) (0.49) (-0.25) (-3.65) (0.04) (0.07) 
SUE   0.250 -0.202 -0.025 0.077 
   (1.13) (-1.49) (-0.19) (1.12) 
Market Cap -0.010*** 0.004*** -0.011*** -0.000 -0.005** 0.003*** 
 (-4.19) (6.01) (-4.03) (-0.25) (-2.06) (5.84) 
Ln(#Analysts) 0.005 0.000 0.007 0.004** 0.001 0.003*** 
 (0.94) (0.35) (1.05) (2.09) (0.27) (2.65) 
Market to Book 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000*** 0.001 0.000** 
 (1.57) (0.32) (0.48) (2.86) (1.32) (2.02) 
Institutional % -0.084*** 0.018*** -0.085*** 0.029*** -0.111*** 0.021*** 
 (-5.97) (5.26) (-5.68) (5.14) (-7.81) (6.50) 
Q4 0.005 0.000 0.008 -0.001 0.006 0.002 
 (1.04) (0.23) (1.38) (-0.51) (1.53) (1.44) 
Observations 10,821 10,821 10,821 10,821 10,821 10,821 
Adjusted R2 0.031 0.017 0.019 0.009 0.043 0.037 
Firm SE cluster yes yes yes yes yes yes 
This table shows the relationship between order imbalance in the -10 to -2 days, -1 to 1 days, and 2 to 60 days relative to the earnings 
announcement for a given firm and attention on social media. Retail order imbalance is calculated using the algorithm in Boehmer et 
al. (2017). Overall order imbalance is calculated using the algorithm in Chakrabarty et al. (2007). Models are run with clustered 
standard errors. *, **, *** indicate significance at p < 0.10, p < 0.05, and p < 0.01 levels, respectively (using two-tailed tests). The t-




Table 6 User Attention and Short-selling 




 Short-10,-2 Short-1,1 Short2,60 
Constant 0.191*** 0.098*** 1.523*** 
 (12.60) (11.15) (9.91) 
Log(#Users)-10,2 0.019*** 0.007*** 0.092*** 
 (3.45) (4.68) (5.82) 
Log(#News Stories-10,-2) -0.000 0.000 0.006 
 (-0.10) (0.60) (1.22) 
Log(#Retail EDGAR IP)-10,-2 -0.000 0.000 0.001 
 (-0.02) (0.72) (0.30) 
SM Sent-10,-2 -0.005 -0.003 0.031 
 (-0.64) (-1.00) (0.91) 
News Sent-10,-2 -0.047 -0.051
* -0.477 
 (-0.57) (-1.90) (-1.42) 
AR-10,-2  0.017 0.114 
  (1.34) (1.00) 
SUE  0.066 -0.170 
  (1.09) (-0.11) 
Market Cap -0.010*** -0.006*** -0.081*** 
 (-11.15) (-10.25) (-9.02) 
Log(#Analysts) 0.009** 0.008*** 0.099*** 
 (2.11) (5.96) (5.39) 
Market to Book -0.001** -0.000*** -0.003*** 
 (-2.27) (-2.77) (-3.15) 
Institutional % -0.010** -0.003 -0.106*** 
 (-2.01) (-1.27) (-3.09) 
q4 0.002 0.000 0.004 
 (0.69) (0.55) (0.60) 
Observations 12,008 12,008 12,008 
Adjusted R2 0.109 0.148 0.130 
Firm SE Cluster yes yes yes 
The dependent variables in this table are market-adjusted abnormal returns in the -10 to -2 days, 
-1 to 1 days, and 2 to 60 days relative to the earnings announcement. Ln(#Topics) is the entropy 
of the topics discussed on StockTwits in the -10 to -2 days relative to earnings. Models are run 
with clustered standard errors. *, **, *** indicate significance at p < 0.10, p < 0.05, and p < 0.01 




Table 7 Cross-sectional analysis 
 
Panel A: Institutional Ownership 
𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑗,[2,60] = 𝛼 +  𝜷𝟏𝑳𝒏(#𝑼𝒔𝒆𝒓𝒔)𝒊,𝒋,[−𝟏𝟎,−𝟐] +  ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑘,𝑖,𝑗
𝑘
+ 𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 
 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 
Constant -0.193*** -0.138* -0.112 -0.138 -0.034 
 (-2.98) (-1.73) (-1.11) (-1.01) (-0.35) 
Log(#Users)-10,2 -0.014*** -0.011** -0.013*** -0.003 -0.001 
 (-3.28) (-2.27) (-2.91) (-0.72) (-0.26) 
Observations 2,453 2,453 2,453 2,453 2,453 
Adjusted R2 0.011 0.016 0.007 0.004 0.001 
Controls yes yes yes yes yes 
Firm SE cluster yes yes yes yes yes 
 
Panel B: Analyst dispersion 
 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 
Constant -0.007 -0.151** -0.185*** -0.284*** -0.358*** 
 (-0.11) (-2.28) (-2.79) (-4.06) (-4.83) 
Log(#Users)-10,2 -0.004 -0.005 -0.005 -0.010** -0.018*** 
 (-0.96) (-1.09) (-1.10) (-2.25) (-3.26) 
Observations 2,453 2,453 2,453 2,453 2,453 
Adjusted R2 0.004 0.002 0.006 0.012 0.019 
Controls yes yes yes yes yes 
Firm SE cluster yes yes yes yes yes 
 
Panel C: Analyst following 
 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 
Constant -0.090 -0.008 -0.178** -0.281*** -0.366*** 
 (-0.99) (-0.08) (-2.14) (-3.42) (-4.34) 
Log(#Users)-10,2 -0.010* -0.011** -0.010** -0.006 -0.013*** 
 (-1.76) (-2.01) (-2.35) (-1.58) (-3.76) 
Observations 2,453 2,453 2,453 2,453 2,453 
Adjusted R2 0.003 0.009 0.003 0.010 0.054 
Controls yes yes yes yes yes 









Table 7 (Cont.) 
Panel D: Social media disagreement 
 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 
Constant -0.049 -0.274*** -0.180*** -0.205*** -0.280*** 
 (-0.71) (-4.12) (-2.90) (-2.80) (-4.36) 
Log(#Users)-10,2 0.003 -0.007* -0.013*** -0.009* -0.018*** 
 (0.47) (-1.71) (-3.31) (-1.94) (-3.03) 
Observations 2,453 2,453 2,453 2,453 2,453 
Adjusted R2 0.005 0.011 0.008 0.004 0.015 
Controls yes yes yes yes yes 
Firm SE cluster yes yes yes yes yes 
 
Panel E: Social media and media sentiment 
 SM+,M- SM-,M+ SM+,M+ SM-,M- 
Constant -0.285 -0.212*** -0.190*** -0.168 
 (-1.58) (-5.14) (-4.20) (-1.59) 
Log(#Users)-10,2 -0.012 -0.005 -0.013*** -0.004 
 (-1.09) (-1.56) (-4.96) (-0.49) 
Observations 817 5,071 5,317 1,038 
Adjusted R2 0.019 0.009 0.011 0.009 
Controls yes yes yes yes 
Firm SE cluster yes yes yes yes 
This table presents the cross-sectional regression results that focus on limits to arbitrage, 
attention from analysts and size (all quintiles are sorted from low to high). Panel A shows the 
results based on quintile of institutional ownership. Panel B shows the results based on quintile 
of analyst dispersion. Panel C shows the results based on quintile of analyst following. Panel D 
shows the results based on quintile of social media disagreement. Panel E is divided by the 
sentiment on social media and the sentiment in the news. SM+ indicates positive sentiment on 
social media, M+ indicates positive sentiment in media articles. The sentiment divisions are 
made on sentiment in the -10 to -2 days relative to each quarterly earnings announcement in the 
sample. Models are run with clustered standard errors. *, **, *** indicate significance at p < 











Table 8 Buying bulls 
𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛼 +  𝜷𝟏𝑳𝒏(#𝑼𝒔𝒆𝒓𝒔)𝒊,𝒋,[−𝟏𝟎,−𝟐] +  ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑘,𝑖,𝑗
𝑘
+ 𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 
 AR-10,-2 AR2,60 
 Pos SM Sent Neg SM Sent Pos SM Sent Neg SM Sent 
Constant -0.117*** -0.139*** -0.214*** -0.210*** 
 (-6.30) (-7.86) (-4.75) (-5.22) 
Ln(#Users)-10,-2 0.006*** -0.000 -0.013*** -0.005 
 (4.21) (-0.03) (-4.59) (-1.57) 
Ln (#News Stories) -10,2 -0.003
*** -0.001 0.002 0.001 
 (-3.29) (-1.62) (0.74) (0.37) 
Ln(#Retail EDGAR IP) -10,2 -0.000 0.000 0.001 -0.001 
 (-1.09) (0.10) (0.79) (-0.82) 
SM Sent-10,2 0.027
** 0.032** 0.060** 0.003 
 (2.43) (2.28) (1.97) (0.10) 
News Sent-10,2 0.306
*** 0.340*** 0.021 0.157 
 (5.08) (6.29) (0.14) (1.34) 
AR-10,-2   -0.068 -0.097
* 
   (-1.35) (-1.95) 
SUE   0.109 0.108 
   (0.28) (0.29) 
Market Cap 0.006*** 0.007*** 0.011*** 0.010*** 
 (5.54) (7.13) (4.32) (4.72) 
Log(#Analysts) -0.008*** -0.011*** -0.013** -0.015*** 
 (-4.16) (-5.44) (-2.21) (-3.09) 
Market to Book -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.001* 
 (-1.61) (0.49) (-0.52) (1.82) 
Institutional % 0.010** 0.010** -0.004 0.014 
 (2.12) (2.18) (-0.37) (1.15) 







Table 8 (Cont.)     
 (7.00) (5.98) (-3.19) (2.82) 
Observations 6,144 6,121 6,144 6,121 
Adjusted R2 0.031 0.036 0.009 0.008 
Firm SE cluster yes yes yes yes 
The dependent variables in this table are market-adjusted abnormal returns in the -10 to -2 days, -1 to 1 days, and 2 to 60 days relative 
to the earnings announcement. The sample is divided by average sentiment on social media. Models are run with clustered standard 
errors. *, **, *** indicate significance at p < 0.10, p < 0.05, and p < 0.01 levels, respectively (using two-tailed tests). The t-statistic is 





Table 9 Within-network dissemination and herding 




 AR-10,-2 AR-1,1 AR2,60 
Constant -0.096*** -0.092** -0.191*** 
 (-5.67) (-2.02) (-4.75) 
Ln(#Top Followed Users)-10,2 0.008*** 0.004 0.003 
 (4.88) (1.09) (0.68) 
Ln(#Users)-10,2 0.001 -0.005** -0.007** 
 (0.56) (-2.27) (-2.22) 
Ln(#News Stories) -10,2 -0.003
*** -0.002 0.001 
 (-3.38) (-1.53) (0.28) 
Ln(#Retail EDGAR IP) -10,2 -0.000 -0.001 0.000 
 (-1.22) (-1.40) (0.28) 
SM Sent-10,2 0.037
*** 0.030** 0.007 
 (4.31) (2.51) (0.35) 
News Sent-10,2 0.376
*** 0.225*** 0.094 
 (6.35) (3.43) (0.74) 
AR-10,-2  -0.057
** -0.133*** 
  (-2.45) (-2.90) 
SUE  1.985*** 0.063 
  (5.72) (0.15) 
Market Cap 0.005*** 0.006*** 0.010*** 
 (5.07) (2.68) (4.63) 
Ln(#Analysts) -0.009*** -0.010*** -0.019*** 
 (-4.74) (-4.00) (-3.52) 
Market to Book -0.000 -0.000** -0.000 
 (-1.23) (-2.42) (-0.06) 
Institutional % 0.011** -0.002 0.014 
 (2.45) (-0.22) (1.05) 
Q4 0.012*** 0.011*** -0.009* 
 (6.32) (3.33) (-1.87) 
Observations 6,514 6,514 6,514 
Adjusted R2 0.041 0.022 0.008 
Firm SE cluster yes yes yes 
The dependent variables in this table are market-adjusted abnormal returns in the -10 to -2 days, 
-1 to 1 days, and 2 to 60 days relative to the earnings announcement. Ln(#Top Followed Users)-
10,-2 is the natural log of the number of unique active users in the set of the 1000 top-followed 
users by year in the -10 to -2 days relative to earnings. Models are run with clustered standard 
errors. *, **, *** indicate significance at p < 0.10, p < 0.05, and p < 0.01 levels, respectively 
(using two-tailed tests). The t-statistic is shown in parenthesis. 
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Table 10 User-generated information and overconfidence 




 AR-10,-2 AR-1,1 AR2,60 
Constant -0.125*** -0.109*** -0.207*** 
 (-10.00) (-4.81) (-6.94) 
Ln(#Topics) -0.001 -0.004* -0.013*** 
 (-0.54) (-1.79) (-3.32) 
Ln(#Users)-10,2 0.004*** 0.001 -0.001 
 (3.10) (0.44) (-0.39) 
Ln(#News Stories) -10,2 -0.002
*** -0.002*** 0.002 
 (-3.39) (-2.63) (0.93) 
Ln(#Retail EDGAR IP) -10,2 -0.000 -0.001
** 0.000 
 (-0.87) (-2.32) (0.17) 
SM Sent-10,2 0.036
*** 0.028*** 0.029* 
 (6.33) (3.89) (1.93) 
News Sent-10,2 0.333
*** 0.216*** 0.061 
 (8.08) (4.56) (0.62) 
AR-10,-2  -0.059
*** -0.084** 
  (-3.63) (-2.38) 
SUE  1.801*** 0.110 
  (10.76) (0.41) 
Market Cap 0.006*** 0.007*** 0.010*** 
 (8.77) (5.56) (6.20) 
Ln(#Analysts) -0.010*** -0.009*** -0.013*** 
 (-7.17) (-4.96) (-3.42) 
Market to Book -0.000 -0.000** 0.000 
 (-0.91) (-2.29) (0.51) 
Institutional % 0.009*** -0.003 0.003 
 (2.83) (-0.56) (0.32) 
Q4 0.013*** 0.007*** -0.002 
 (9.10) (3.10) (-0.41) 
Observations 12,265 12,265 12,265 
Adjusted R2 0.034 0.034 0.008 
Firm SE cluster yes yes yes 
The dependent variables in this table are market-adjusted abnormal returns in the -10 to -2 days, 
-1 to 1 days, and 2 to 60 days relative to the earnings announcement. Ln(#Topics) is the entropy 
of the topics discussed on StockTwits in the -10 to -2 days relative to earnings. Models are run 
with clustered standard errors. *, **, *** indicate significance at p < 0.10, p < 0.05, and p < 0.01 




Table 11 Grainger-causality tests 
 
Full Timespan (2014, 2015) 
Variable Grainger Causes Chi-Squared Probability>Chi-
Squared 
ΔLn(#Users) Return 36.461*** 0.000 
Return ΔLn(#Users) 11.928*** 0.001 
 
2 to 60 Days After Earnings Announcement 
Variable Grainger Causes Chi-Squared Probability>Chi-
Squared 
ΔLn(#Users) Return 0.114 0.736 







index place #members index place #members 
0 Las Vegas 282 18 Seattle 768 
1 New York City 1,690 19 Baltimore 371 
2 Santa Monica 650 20 Dallas 623 
3 Colorado 449 21 San Diego 311 
4 Calgary 370 22 Toronto 734 
5 West Palm Beach 339 23 Fort Meyers 164 
6 Philadelphia 394 24 San Francisco 378 
7 Long Island 274 25 Atlanta 330 
8 Raleigh-Durham 223 26 Augusta 348 
9 Austin 352 27 Nashville 129 
10 Detroit 497 28 Chicago 477 
11 Frederick 35 29 Kansas City 507 
12 Fort Worth 272 30 Washington DC 215 
13 Pensacola 301 31 Miami 177 
14 Portland 21 32 Cincinnati 138 
15 Boston 693 33 Topeka 61 
16 Cleveland 501 34 Phoenix 92 
17 Irvine 271 Total World 13,437 
 





Figure 2.1. Simulation of mispricing using equilibrium point in Kelly and Tetlock (2013). I use 
the equilibrium price for short-short selling constrained investors without disagreement:  







I use 𝛾𝐴 = 10, 𝛾𝐵 = 1, 𝛾𝐶 = 10, 𝜃 = 0.3, and vary sentiment, m and attention, α. The variable γ 
is the risk tolerance of each investor group in {A, B, C}. The variable α is the level of attention 
from investors in group A. The variable θ represents the percent of the population in the set A 




















Figure 4.1. Extreme quintile cumulative abnormal returns for companies that had net positive 
sentiment and beat analyst expectations. 
 
 
Figure 4.2. Extreme quintile cumulative abnormal returns for companies that had net positive 







Figure 5: StockTwits post example. 
 
 
 
